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NOTES

eMonopoly
WHY INTERNET-BASED MONOPOLIES HAVE AN
INHERENT “GET-OUT-OF-JAIL-FREE CARD”
INTRODUCTION
The modern-day reliance on digital media has
dramatically broadened access to all forms of news, ideas, and
information.1 This development is due in large part to the
increased presence of the Internet, which is without precedent in
openness, universal accessibility, efficiency, and versatility as a
mode of communication.2 Unfortunately, regulatory laws have
failed to keep pace with the advance of technology,3 and the
Internet remains substantially unregulated.4 As a result, the
most widely used and most “dominant communications medium

1

See David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet
Economy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 285, 288-89 (2008) (outlining the growing trends of
access to Internet services via computers and personal computing devices); see also Internet,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet#Information (last visited Sept. 28, 2010)
(“The Web has . . . enabled individuals and organizations to publish ideas and information to
a potentially large audience online at greatly reduced expense and time delay.”).
2
Jay Dratler, Jr., Why Antitrust Matters in Cyberspace: A Brief Essay,
CYBERLAW, http://gozips.uakron.edu/~dratler/2005cyberlaw/materials/whyantitrust.htm
(last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
3
EDWARD LEE LAMOUREUX ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW &
INTERACTIVE MEDIA: FREE FOR A FEE 2 (2009).
4
Dratler, supra note 2. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
has proposed net neutrality principles that would formalize rules meant to keep
Internet providers from discriminating against certain content flowing over their
networks. Saul Hansel, F.C.C. Chairman Is Expected to Propose Neutrality Principles
for the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2009, at B3. However, if anything this regulation
only strengthens the claim that Internet content is to a large extent unfettered.
Moreover, challenges to FCC net neutrality are taking shape in the form of legislation
seeking to “keep the Internet free from government control and regulation.” Marguerite
Reardon, Net Neutrality Faces Political, Legal Hurdles, CNN.COM, Oct. 24, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/10/24/net.neutrality.politics/index.html.
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. . . is . . . unregulated and entirely at the mercy of domination by
private commercial forces acting in their own self-interest.”5
With the Internet’s unregulated nature threatening
monopolistic consolidation of Internet services, the specter of
eMonopolies—those Internet domains that offer an everexpanding menu of services, collecting more and more devoted
patronage among Internet users, and deriving revenue
exclusively from advertising—is a palpable possibility. In
response to this threat, antitrust law has been recognized as
representing the only hope of “prevent[ing] a single private
firm, or single individual, from ‘cornering the market’ in means
of [digital] expression.”6 But antitrust enforcement in what has
been dubbed the “new economy”7 could be problematic because
enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), as well as the
federal courts, arguably lack the resources to cope with such a
dynamic, rapidly advancing, and innovative economic model.8
In addition to rapid Internet development, antitrust
enforcement is further complicated by the nature of the
Internet-based economy, which grows every year9 and has
largely been developed on a platform where “information is
free.”10 The web-based economy’s reliance on the use of free,
where the market default rate for Internet services is no more
than the cost of Internet access, represents a significant
wrinkle for antitrust analysis.11 It allows a web-based firm,
such as Google—the ubiquitous Internet service provider—to

5

Dratler, supra note 2.
KENNETH L. PORT ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 426 (2d ed. 2005).
7
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925,
925 (2001) (defining the new economy as the industries of computer software
manufacturing, Internet-based business, and telecommunications services).
8
Id.
9
As of September 2009, nearly 80% of the North American population has
access to the Internet—a growth of 140% since the year 2000. Internet Usage Statistics
for the Americas, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm
(last visited Oct. 24, 2010) [hereinafter INTERNET WORLD STATS]. With the advent and
proliferation of mobile Internet access, this number is expected to rise considerably in
the coming years. Evans, supra note 1, at 289.
10
DAVID B. KOPEL, ANTITRUST AFTER MICROSOFT: THE OBSOLESCENCE OF
ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL ERA 13 (2001).
11
See Chris Anderson, Commentary: Google and Microsoft Free-for-All,
CNN.COM (July 8, 2009, 10:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/07/08/anderson.
google.antitrust.law/index.html.
6
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offer a host of free services,12 establish a devoted user base, and
then generate substantial revenue derived exclusively from
advertisements.13 Where a firm gains legal monopoly power in
one service14—such as Google’s arguable monopoly on search
queries—the firm would face no obstacle in broadening that
consumer dependence to other services it chooses to acquire. In
so doing, such a firm could restrict access to information,
control the advertising markets, and thus control how
consumers engage in commerce. The problem for antitrust
analysis arises because consolidation of economic power—
traditionally the target of antitrust laws15—in an economy
where consumers are not subject to potential market abuses
because the services are free, may render the antitrust laws’
consumer-welfare goals inapplicable.
This note recognizes the antitrust threat imposed by
eMonopolies. Specifically, the note will focus on Google,16 which
is the leading Internet-based business.17 Google has already
attracted the attention of antitrust regulators and has been
characterized as “a dominant behemoth, one that ha[s] the
potential to stifle innovation and squash its competitors.”18 This
note explains how Internet-based businesses’ reliance on free
services and the inherent characteristics of the web-based
business—including rapid technological advancement—
complicate application of the antitrust laws against
eMonopolies and make any attempts to litigate against Google
difficult. Consequently, new approaches to antitrust
12

Services provided by Google include a search engine, e-mail server, map
generator, and word processor, among many others. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com
(last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
13
Anderson, supra note 11.
14
See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)) (no antitrust violation
where the monopolist gained his advantage through “superior product, business
acumen or history”); see also infra Part I.B.3.
15
Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the
Twenty-First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 539 (2007).
16
Because Google is the current leading Internet-based business and has
attracted so much attention, this note refers to Google as an example as well as uses
“Google” as an abstract placeholder for eMonopolies in general.
17
To illustrate, as of September 2009, Google held an 80% share of the Internet
search market, its primary field, while its nearest competitor, Yahoo!, held only 9%.
Internet Search Mkt Share: Bing’s Loss Is Google’s Gain, ECONOMIC TIMES (Oct. 2, 2009,
4:40 PM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Internet-search-mkt-share-Bings-loss-isGoogles-gain/articleshow/5080917.cms [hereinafter Bing’s Loss, Google’s Gain].
18
Fred Vogelstein, Why Is Obama’s Top Antitrust Cop Gunning for Google?,
WIRED (July 20, 2009), available at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-08/
mf_googlopoly?currentpage=all.
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enforcement should be implemented, approaches that recognize
the difficulties of traditional enforcement and take into account
the noneconomic detriments of monopolies.
Part I of this note provides a brief history of federal
antitrust law. It articulates the often-complicated judicial
interpretation of antitrust principles, particularly with respect to
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,19 which prohibits a single
firm from becoming a monopoly. Part II explores the world of
Internet business, focusing on Google’s history and business
development. It also examines recent Sherman Act antitrust
actions against Google and other new-economy businesses.
Part III probes the antitrust implications of such
Internet-based market power particularly with respect to
Section 2 monopolization claims. It argues that the web-based
model of free and the unilateral innovation of Internet
technology development make application of Section 2 difficult.
To do so, Part III shows the problematic application of a
Section 2 claim to an eMonopoly.
Finally, Part IV suggests how antitrust enforcement in
the new economy should proceed, including how the
noneconomic considerations of media consolidation and privacy
should be included in evaluating the impact of unilateral
monopolization by eMonopolies. Part V concludes by suggesting
that antitrust regulators must adopt broad, forward-looking
analytical models to keep pace with the rapid entrenchment of
modern eMonopolies.
I.

FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW

The underlying rationale for the federal antitrust laws,
in large part, has been to combat the perceived dangers of
concentrated economic power.20 In keeping with the rationale
that consolidated economic power poses a threat, the goals of
antitrust legislation have been interpreted to be both social
(such as maximizing competition and diversifying market
power for the benefit of free-market entrepreneurs)21 and
economic (such as protecting the welfare of consumers from

19

15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
Stucke, supra note 15, at 539 (explaining that “growing concern for increased
concentration of economic power” has led to increased antitrust enforcement).
21
JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS 12 (1993).
20
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potential abuses resulting from monopoly power or collusive
horizontal conduct).22
Competition law in the United States began as a means
for the federal government to proportionally respond to the
domination of the nineteenth-century marketplace by rapidly
growing industrial giants.23 As such, early antitrust
enforcement targeted smoke-stack industries, such as steel and
oil24—industries that, unlike Internet-based businesses,
advanced slowly and attracted infrequent competitive
entrants.25 The antitrust laws were seen as vital to the
“preservation of economic freedom and [the United States’]
free-enterprise system.”26 Indeed, in Northern Pacific Railway
v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that the antitrust
regime’s preservation of free and unfettered competition
“provid[es] an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic, political and social institutions.”27
The story of U.S. antitrust law begins in 1890 with the
passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act (the Sherman Act).28 The
Sherman Act is the “Magna Carta”29 of antitrust legislation and
all subsequent legislation was enacted to supplement its
provisions.30 The Sherman Act’s primary operating provisions
are Section 1, which declares that “[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal,”31
and Section 2, which declares that “[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce” will be guilty of a felony.32

22

Id.
Id. at 8 (describing the origin of the term “antitrust” as referring to the
practice of large enterprises “collecting shareholder voting power in the hands of a
single managing trustee. Efforts to control these powerful interests were known as
antitrust laws.”).
24
Posner, supra note 7, at 926.
25
Id.
26
United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
27
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
28
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
29
Topco, 405 U.S. at 610.
30
SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 21, at 14.
31
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
32
Id. § 2.
23
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Sherman Act Section 1—Combination

Given that any economic combination has at least a
negligible economic effect on competition,33 Section 1 prohibits
only those combinations restraining trade that result in some
cognizable injury to competition.34 Therefore, the Sherman Act
prohibits only restraints of trade that unreasonably restrict
competition.35 To determine reasonableness, contemporary
courts rely primarily on a “rule of reason” analysis to
determine whether the restraint is likely to have
anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is
reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that
outweigh those anticompetitive effects.36 Although courts have
imposed per se liability where the anticompetitive effects of an
agreement are readily apparent and there are no redeeming
effects,37 this imposition is strictly limited to circumstances
where the negative economic impact is immediately obvious.38
B.

Sherman Act Section 2—Monopolization

This note focuses on Sherman Act Section 2 and its
applicability to eMonopolies. Unlike Section 1, which explicitly
requires multilateral conduct in order to find an antitrust
violation,39 Sherman Act Section 2 outlaws unilateral
monopolization. To be liable under Section 2, the alleged
monopolist must possess monopoly power in a relevant
market,40 and must have acquired or maintained—or attempted
to acquire or maintain—monopoly power through exclusionary,
33

SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 21, at 15 (“[E]very sales contract
removes one buyer and one seller from the market for the duration of the contract, and
to that extent restrains trade.”).
34
Coal. for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 567 F.3d 1084, 1089
(9th Cir. 2009) (citing Kendall v. Visa, 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008)).
35
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911) (emphasis added).
36
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 9
(2007) [hereinafter DOJ & FTC, PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt07
04.pdf.
37
Major League Baseball Props. Inc. v. Salvino, 542 F.3d 290, 315 (2d Cir. 2008).
38
Id.; see also, e.g., Toledo Mack Sales & Serv. v. Mack Trucks, 530 F.3d 204,
220-21 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that a “gentleman’s agreement” among competitor
dealers to control prices was a per se impermissible horizontal agreement in violation
of Section 1).
39
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (outlawing “contract[s]” and “combinations”).
40
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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anticompetitive conduct.41 Consequently, the acquisition of
monopoly power by possessing a superior product, superior
business acumen, or favorable history will not give rise to
Section 2 enforcement.42
1. Relevant Market
Defining the relevant market is the first step in
evaluating a Section 2 claim,43 as it “determine[s] the
boundaries within which effective competition occurs or,
conversely, market power is exercised.”44 The relevant market
refers to the groups of producers that, because of their
products’ similarity, have the ability—actual or potential—to
take significant business away from each other.45 A relevant
market is composed of a product market (identifying what
service or good is at issue in the applicable competition) and a
geographic market (identifying the physical boundaries of the
competition).46 For our purposes, we will not dwell on
establishing a geographic market. Given the widespread use
and availability of the Internet—which spans the entire
developed world47—defining a geographic market establishes no
practical limit; therefore, we instead focus our efforts on
defining the product market.
A relevant product market has historically been defined
as products “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the
same purposes.”48 The idea behind this restriction is simply to
ensure that competitors are competing in the same
competition. Picture a consumer who wishes to purchase an
apple; if he encounters predatory pricing of oranges, it will
have little impact on his decision to buy an apple and therefore
will have limited anticompetitive effect on apple merchants. Of
course, the relevant market definitions litigated in real-world
41

Id. at 571.
United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
43
See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 496 (2d
Cir. 2004). Where a claim is based on per se unlawful activity, however, no inquiry into
the relevant markets is required. See, e.g., Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 385
(9th Cir. 1978).
44
SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 21, at 29.
45
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 51-52.
46
SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 21, at 30-31.
47
To illustrate, as of December 2009, 76.2% of the North American
population has access to the Internet, experiencing a growth of nearly 140% between
2000 and 2009. INTERNET WORLD STATS, supra note 9.
48
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
42
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antitrust actions are far less simplistic and often involve highly
subtle market distinctions. To illustrate, in the seminal case
United States v. E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co.,49 a Section 2 suit
was brought against a producer of cellophane plastic wrapping.
The Court held that cellophane wrapping was not a sufficiently
defined market, as there were other flexible packaging
materials that a consumer could easily substitute in place of
the defendant’s cellophane packing material.50 As the next
section discusses, defining a relevant market in the context of
an eMonopoly will not be as intuitive.51
2. Monopoly Power
Monopoly power is the second element of a Section 2
violation. Monopoly power refers to the “power to control prices
or exclude competition” in relation to the relevant market.52 The
market share held by an alleged monopolist, although not
dispositive of the ability to control the market, is a strong
indicator of monopoly power, and courts ordinarily infer
market power from dominant market share.53 As a result,
establishing monopoly power is a minimally controversial
requirement in antitrust analysis.54 Once again, however,
application of monopoly power in the unique context of an
Internet-based eMonopoly poses a problem: the inherent
characteristics of Internet business predispose it to sustained
monopoly power.55
3. Anticompetitive Conduct
The last element of Section 2 monopolization is the
achievement of monopolistic market power through
anticompetitive conduct.56 This ensures that competitors who
achieve their market power through vigorous and honest
49

Id. at 378.
Id. at 400.
51
See infra Part III.A.
52
E.I. du Pont Nemours, 351 U.S. at 391.
53
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (outlining
instances where market power was inferred from a showing of market shares of 80%,
90%, and 87%).
54
Id. (stating that monopoly power can generally be inferred from market
share, whereas the relevant market, in which to measure market share, may be more
difficult to ascertain).
55
See infra Part III.B.
56
Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71.
50
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competition will not be punished for winning the competition,
and in turn, avoids a disincentive to innovate.57 Innovation is a
major component of high-technology competition, where
advancement and development occur at an unprecedented
pace.58 As such, it is crucial that antitrust enforcement in the
new economy does not stifle innovation. Therefore, it is
important that monopolistic conduct require something beyond
mere dominant market share to avoid punishing a firm for
securing economic success as a consequence of a “superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”59 Indeed, “the
law does not make mere size an offense.”60 An antitrust plaintiff
must show that the defendant’s conduct had an anticompetitive
effect that outweighs any procompetitive justification the
defendant may proffer.61 Therefore, exclusion resulting from
skill or foresight alone will not suffice absent a showing that
the alleged monopolist acted on some basis other than profit
maximization or operating efficiency.62
This standard appears to be straightforward—
establishing a logical demarcation between permissible and
prohibited conduct. In practice, however, the point at which
aggressive competition becomes anticompetitive conduct is
wholly unclear.63 The clemency offered to competitors guilty of
nothing more than aggressive competition reflects what seems
to be a cost/benefit analysis and mirrors the “rule of reason”
analysis applied in Section 1 claims.64 Adhering to this
characterization of Section 2 anticompetitive conduct, many
litigants will often have to follow a pattern of allegation and
counterallegation that looks as follows: (1) plaintiff must allege
anticompetitive conduct and a resulting anticompetitive effect;
(2) defendant must counter this allegation by proffering a pro57

Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 407 (2004).
58
Posner, supra note 7, at 925.
59
Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571.
60
United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
61
United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
62
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985).
63
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 34 (2008) [hereinafter DOJ,
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/
236681.pdf (“While there is general consensus that clearer and more predictable
standards are desirable, legal scholarship and the record from the hearings suggest far
less consensus on what those standards should be.”).
64
Harry First & Andrew I. Gavil, Re-framing Windows: The Durable
Meaning of the Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 641, 650-51 (2006).
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competitive justification; (3) the burden then shifts back to the
plaintiff to rebut the defendant’s procompetitive justification;
and finally, (4) if the procompetitive justification remains
unrebutted, the court will weigh the anticompetitive effects
against the procompetitive justification.65
C.

Sherman Act Section 2—Attempted Monopolization

Under Section 2, an antitrust action can also be brought
under an attempted-monopolization theory.66 Unlike straight
monopolization claims—where the plaintiff must show an
existing dominance in a relevant market—an attemptedmonopolization claim comes before the creation of monopoly
power that leads to market abuse.67 An attempted
monopolization claim requires the plaintiff to demonstrate three
elements: (1) that the defendant is guilty of anticompetitive
conduct, (2) that there is a “dangerous probability” of eventual
monopoly power, and (3) that the defendant had a specific intent
to achieve such monopolization.68
The distinctions between straight monopolization and
attempted monopolization require a brief explanation. First, the
dangerous-probability element calls for a consideration of the
“relevant market and the defendant’s ability to lessen or destroy
competition in that market.”69 Courts generally consider this
element in much the same way they consider the monopolypower element of a straight monopolization claim, taking into
account, of course, that they are applying a forward-looking
perspective to the potential of monopolization and not the
reality.70 Given the theoretical underpinning of the claim,
however, courts accept a lesser showing of market power for the
dangerous-probability element.71
The second peculiarity that distinguishes an attempted
monopolization case from a straight one—and an element that

65

Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” (emphasis added)).
67
See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1993).
68
Id. at 456.
69
Id.
70
See DOJ, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, supra note 63, at 6-7.
71
See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1438 (9th Cir.
1995) (“[T]he minimum showing of market share required in an attempt case is a lower
quantum than the minimum showing required in an actual monopolization case.”).
66
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will have consequences when applied to an attempted
eMonopoly—is intent. The Supreme Court has enunciated why
the intent element inheres in the attempted monopolization
claim:
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which
the law seeks to prevent—for instance, the monopoly—but require
further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that
result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to
produce a dangerous probability that it will happen.72

The distinguishing factor is that an attempted monopolization
has not yet achieved dominance; its only ostensible infraction is
amassing a dangerous probability of monopoly power. Thus, to
criminalize what is not yet a crime, the Court suggests, there
must be intent to impermissibly “destroy competition or build
monopoly.”73
Finally, although conduct that is legal for a monopolist—
efficiency-enhancing aggressive competition—is
necessarily
legal for an attempted monopolist, the same cannot be said for
conduct that is ordinarily illegal for a monopolist.74 If a firm
lacks monopoly power but displays only a probability of potential
monopoly power, its conduct could not have as much
anticompetitive impact as a monopolist’s conduct.75 Although
specific intent can be gleaned from the egregiousness of
anticompetitive conduct,76 such conduct by a web-based business
is uniquely difficult to define, making it very difficult to sustain
an attempted-monopolization claim against an attempted
eMonopoly.77
II.

ANTITRUST AND THE INTERNET

Like any other industry, the monopolization of the
“information superhighway” components is not a surprising
development. With the increased reliance on digital media and
the near-ubiquitous presence of the Internet,78 it is no wonder
72

McQuillan, 506 U.S. at 455 (quoting Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.
375, 396 (1905)).
73
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953).
74
DOJ, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, supra note 63, at 6.
75
Id.
76
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 609 n.39
(1985) (“Proof of specific intent to engage in [monopolistic conduct] may be in the form
of . . . evidence that the conduct was not related to any apparent efficiency.”).
77
See infra Part IV.B.
78
See INTERNET WORLD STATS, supra note 9.
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that Internet-based businesses are seeing growing profits and
expanding.79 With the growth of some web-based businesses and
the resulting entrenchment of dominant players, antitrust
enforcement on behalf of less powerful competitors naturally
follows to counter this pattern.80 This part will briefly explore the
nature of Internet businesses. It will focus on Google—the
modern-day Internet giant—and explore Google’s business
practices, including its free services and the link to profitproducing components. In addition, this part will discuss how
eMonopolies, Google in particular, have been challenged under
the Sherman Act in the recent years.
A.

Google’s Internet Business

Google serves as a good example of a potential
eMonopoly for several reasons. First, Google is the current
monolith of the digital business world. Not only does it possess
overwhelming market share in its primary search capacity,81
but its menu of services seems to grow every day.82 Second,
Google displays characteristics that both warrant examination
under, and discourage application of, the antitrust laws.
Finally, the Obama administration has signaled that it plans to
reverse the lax enforcement policies of its predecessor and step
up antitrust enforcement in high-technology markets.83 Google
is a likely target given its growing stranglehold on Internet
79

Google announced on October 15, 2009 that its quarterly revenues for the
quarter ending September 30, 2009 reached $5.94 billion, which represented a 7%
increase over the revenues generated in the same quarter for the year 2008. Press
Release, Google, Google Announces Third Quarter 2009 Results 1 (Oct. 15, 2009)
[hereinafter Google 2009 Third Quarter], available at http://static.googleusercontent.
com/external_content/untrusted_dlcp/www.google.com/en/us/intl/en/press/pressrel/2009
Q3_earnings_google.pdf.
80
In contrast to the increasing revenues reported by Google, see id., Yahoo!
reported third quarter revenues of $1.575 billion, which represents a 12% decrease from the
third quarter 2008. Press Release, Yahoo, Inc., Yahoo! Reports Third Quarter 2009 Results
1 (Oct. 20, 2009), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/YHOO/763515423x0x
325221/05a85efe-1094-49b2-95bb-6de5ab880392/YHOO_Q32009EarningsRelease_Final.pdf.
81
See supra note 17.
82
For example, in October 2009, Google released a program called “Google
Wave” to a limited number of testers. This program combines e-mail, chat, blogs and
photo sharing into one comprehensive digital format. The program is contemplated by
Google developers to be the future of online communication, supplanting e-mail. John D.
Sutter, Google Wave to Be Released to 100,000 Testers Wednesday, CNN.COM (Sept. 30,
2009, 8:02 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/09/29/google.wave.beta/index.html. In
addition, Google has recently expanded into travel services, providing information on
flights and fares directly on its website. Brad Stone & Jad Mouawad, Giant Step into
Travel for Google, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2010, at B1.
83
Vogelstein, supra note 18.
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business. It has even been singled out as a target by the head
of the Antitrust Division.84
So far, Google’s unilateral Internet domination has
avoided monopolization scrutiny. Although its various
combinations, such as Google-DoubleClick,85 have raised
eyebrows across the antitrust-enforcement regime, its
unilateral conduct has not been subject to scrutiny.86 This can
be attributed in large part to the very reason for its dominance:
its superior product and an altruistic business philosophy,
exemplified by Google’s motto, “Don’t be evil.”87 But because it
has amassed such dominant market power and because
government oversight is likely to increase, every new product
and service Google launches is likely to attract vigorous
antitrust scrutiny.88
Google was founded in 1997, offering only a search
engine.89 This was the first service offered by Google90 and
remains the service for which it most well known. At the time
of Google’s founding, search engines were in their infancy and
were not nearly as effective as they are today.91 Rather than
directing patrons to the sites that best served their needs, early
search engines directed patrons to the sites that best served
the needs of their advertising partners by funneling patrons to
sponsored sites.92
Rejecting this consumer-second philosophy, Google
implemented a revolutionary search-engine model known as
PageRank, developed by founders Sergey Brin and Larry

84

Id.
See infra Part II.B.1.
86
Tom Krazit, Google Adjusts to Life with Trustbusters, CNETNEWS.COM
(Sept. 29, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30684_3-10362108-265.html.
87
The code of conduct states:
85

“Don’t be evil.” Googlers generally apply those words to how we serve our
users. But “Don’t be evil” is much more than that. Yes, it’s about providing
our users unbiased access to information, focusing on their needs and giving
them the best products and services that we can. But it’s also about doing the
right thing more generally—following the law, acting honorably and treating
each other with respect.
Investor Relations, Code of Conduct, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/conduct.html
(last updated Apr. 8, 2009).
88
Krazit, supra note 86.
89
Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1334-35 (2008).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1335.
92
Id. at 1335-36.
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Page.93 PageRank is an algorithm-based program that
calculates a website’s relevance to a user’s query. The program
first calculates the popularity and importance of a website by
the frequency with which it is linked throughout the Internet.94
PageRank then analyzes the text, content, and even
surrounding web pages of a site to determine how relevant
those sites are to specific user searches.95 By displaying its
search results this way, Google separated itself from other
search engines by returning “noticeably better [results] and
allow[ing] users to obtain more relevant results in response to
their search terms.”96
With its superior product and growing user base, Google
was able to adopt an advertising scheme that would eventually
generate 97% of its total revenue.97 Google’s advertising scheme
employs two main systems, AdWords and AdSense. AdWords
allows advertisers to select keywords associated with their
product.98 When a user enters these keywords into a search
query, the advertiser’s ad is displayed alongside the search
results as a link in a neutral panel under a header titled
“Sponsored Links”; the link leads the user to the advertiser’s
web content.99 This system allows Google to maintain the
integrity of its search results while simultaneously directing
users to the maximum number of relevant, paid
advertisements.100
AdSense is Google’s second major advertising scheme.
In some respects, AdSense is a reverse of AdWords. Under this
program, Google pays third-party websites to display AdWord
ads generated by Google.101 These are paid directly by Google,
while Google receives the same revenue generated by AdWords

93

Id. at 1337.
Corporate Info, Technology Overview, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
corporate/tech.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
95
Id.
96
Lastowka, supra note 89, at 1337.
97
Google 2009 Third Quarter, supra note 79.
98
AdWords, GOOGLE, https://adwords.google.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
99
Lastowka, supra note 89, at 1339. The neutral panel displaying the
advertisement is not necessarily related to the search results. Therefore, Google
simultaneously returns search results relevant to the search query and unrelated to
sites from which Google generates revenue—thereby maximizing exposure of
advertising partners without sacrificing search result integrity. Id.
100
Id. at 1338-40.
101
See AdSense, GOOGLE, http://adsense.google.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
94

2011]

eMONOPOLY

745

when the embedded AdWords-generated links are used on the
third-party sites.102
With the ability to feed off of its dominant market share
in search and generate impressive advertisement revenues as a
result of that dominance, Google supplements its search service
with other programs, such as Google News, Google Docs, and
Gmail.103 It is capable of such drastic expansion because this
type of digital expansion requires very minimal start-up costs.104
In fact, an increasingly common characteristic of Internet
content is that it is user-generated.105 For example, there is
social-networking content on Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter,
and multimedia content on YouTube—virtually all of which are
user-generated.106 Because these websites have to allot minimal
resources into generating content, they have very small
overhead costs, enabling a monopolist like Google to freely
expand, grow, and entrench itself.
B.

Recent Antitrust Enforcement

It is no wonder that the characteristics of web-based
businesses—high rates of innovation, minimal start-up costs,
and devoted user patronage—can quickly result in substantial
domination in relevant digital markets. It follows, then, that
such players in dominant positions are subject to intense
antitrust investigation. Below is a sample of recent
investigations and enforcement efforts triggered by the conduct
of high-technology corporations. Note that investigation of
Google has focused almost entirely on its multilateral
combinations, not its unilateral anticompetitive conduct.
1. Google/DoubleClick Deal—2007
On April 13, 2007, Google announced its plans to
“acquire DoubleClick, Inc., a global leader in digital marketing
technology and services.”107 According to a Google press release,
102

Lastowka, supra note 89, at 1349.
See List of Google Products, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
List_of_Google_products (last modified Oct. 20, 2010).
104
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology
Competition, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 86-87 (2002).
105
See Evans, supra note 1, at 291.
106
Id.
107
Press Release, Google, Google to Acquire DoubleClick (Apr. 13, 2007),
http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/doubleclick.html.
103
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“[the] transaction [would] strengthen [their] advertising
network by expanding [their] access to publisher inventory and
enabling [them] to serve the needs of a broader set of
advertisers and ad agencies.”108 This result would be achieved
by combining Google’s already growing search-advertising
platform with DoubleClick’s innovative digital marketing
technology that provides graphical display images.109 This
combination would expand Google’s appeal to corporate
advertisers and allow it to incorporate third-party
advertisers,110 such as those associated with Google’s AdSense
program.111
This merger was instantly recognized as an antitrust
concern and was investigated by the FTC112 and later by
lawmakers in Congress.113 Although much attention was given
to the privacy concerns implicated by the agreement,114 the
anticompetitive potential inherent in such a combination
threatened to further entrench Google in the searchadvertising market to the point where no rival could compete.115
The FTC eventually approved the agreement when the agency
found that the agreement did not threaten to reduce
competition since neither Google nor DoubleClick held “market
power” in a relevant market.116 Although the agreement
eventually escaped antitrust enforcement, it is a good example
108

Id. (quoting Tim Armstrong, Google’s President, Advertising and Commerce,
North America).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
See AdSense, supra note 101.
112
Iain Thomson, FTC Investigates Google DoubleClick Deal, PCAUTHORITY
(May 30, 2007), http://www.pcauthority.com.au/News/82399,ftc-investigates-googledoubleclick-deal.aspx.
113
Peter Kaplan, US Lawmakers Plan Google-DoubleClick Deal Hearings,
REUTERS, July 18, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN183266972
0070719.
114
The agreement increased Google’s capacity to
stor[e] information obtained through the retention of users’ search terms in
ways and for purposes other than those consented to or relied upon by such
consumers; causing them to believe, falsely, that their online activities would
remain anonymous; and undermining their ability to avail themselves of the
privacy protections promised by online companies.
Thomson, supra note 112 (quoting Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for
Investigation and Other Relief, In re Google, Inc. and DoubleClick Inc., available at
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/epic_complaint.pdf); see also infra Part IV.C.2.
115
See Kaplan, supra note 113.
116
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of the FTC Concerning Google/DoubleClick,
FTC File No.071-0170, at 8-9 [hereinafter FTC on Google/DoubleClick], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf.
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of how Google’s dominant position exposes each of its
combinations to potential antitrust enforcement. It also shows
how enforcement efforts have focused almost exclusively on
Google’s multilateral combinations.117
2. Proposed Google Books Settlement Agreement—
2008-2009
Google was also the subject of an antitrust investigation
in October 2008.118 At that time, a settlement agreement was
announced in the ongoing copyright-infringement litigation
between Google, Inc., and the Association of American
Publishers over the Google Books Project.119 The Google Books
Project attempted to scan millions of copyrighted works of
literature into Google’s digital database.120 The agreement—
which would have released Google from copyright liability and
established a Book Rights Registry with the authority to
negotiate on behalf of the copyright owners as a class121—
awakened fears of an Internet-based monopoly on digital
literature.122
The potential for a single information source through the
consolidation of media outlets is not unlikely. And it would hinder
the achievement of media’s primary purpose: a gateway to
“information that enables citizens to participate in the democratic
process.”123 The Google Book Settlement Agreement would have
effectively established a single source for digital copyrighted
literature and appeared to be an initial stepping stone to a

117

See Krazit, supra note 86 (highlighting recent antitrust scrutiny limited to
multi-party collusive conduct).
118
See generally James Grimmelman, How to Fix the Google Book Search
Settlement, J. INTERNET L., Apr. 2009, at 1, 11-20; Statement of Interest of the United
States of America Regarding Proposed Class Settlement, Authors Guild, Inc., v. Google
Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009) [hereinafter DOJ Brief], available at
http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/usa.pdf.
119
See Proposed Settlement, Authors Guild, No. 05-CV-8136-DC, available at
http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/r/view_settlement_agreement.
120
Jonathan Band, A Guide for the Perplexed: Libraries and the Google Library
Project Settlement, AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION (Nov. 13, 2008), http://www.arl.org/
bm~doc/google-settlement-13nov08.pdf.
121
Proposed Settlement—Article VI, Authors Guild, No. 05-CV-8136-DC,
available at http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/r/view_settlement_agreement.
122
See generally Grimmelman, supra note 118.
123
Sen. Paul Wellstone, Growing Media Consolidation Must Be Examined to
Preserve Our Democracy, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 551, 551 (2001).
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consolidation of information sources, akin to the consolidation
observed in other media.124
Indeed, the antitrust implications of the settlement
garnered so much opposition that the agreement was scrapped,125
and a modified settlement was negotiated. Paramount among
the opponents was the DOJ, which filed a statement of interest
in the case.126 The DOJ’s brief highlighted the difficulties raised
by the Books Rights Registry—namely, its exclusive authority to
negotiate on behalf of the certified class and its inclusion of
orphan works.127
The DOJ raised several arguments. After making
arguments not directly relevant to this note,128 the DOJ
contended that the agreement granted Google substantially
unrivaled ability to sell a complete database of “orphan
works.”129 Orphan works are copyrighted works of copyright
holders who are difficult or impossible to contact.130 If Google is
given exclusive right to display these works, and their orphan
status precludes others from making similar agreements, no
other competitor would be able to match that capability. In so
doing, the DOJ argued, Google would erase any possibility of
interchangeability.131
In light of the DOJ’s objections and the accompanying
threat of litigation, the settlement was revised, and a modified
agreement was filed in federal district court on November 13,
2009.132 The revised agreement addressed the DOJ’s concerns

124

See Viktor Mayer-Shonberger, In Search of a Story: Narratives of
Intellectual Property, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶¶ 36-37 (2005). Mayer-Shonberger
documents how the “six major” telecommunications companies control over 96% of the
market in cinemas and that the mergers creating AOL/Time-Warner and the like will
only expedite that consolidation. Id. ¶ 42.
125
Motoko Rich, Google to Revise a Book Pact by Nov. 9, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2009, at B2.
126
See generally DOJ Brief, supra note 118.
127
Id. at 24.
128
The DOJ first challenged the class certification arguing that it violated
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Id. at 4-5. Next, the DOJ argued that the Books
Rights Registry would give the publishers, acting collectively, impressible authority to
restrict prices in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 16.
129
Id. at 24.
130
Orphan Works, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orphan_works (last
modified Sept. 14, 2010).
131
DOJ Brief, supra note 118, at 24.
132
Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No.
05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://books.google.com/google
books/agreement. The Court granted preliminary approval on November 19, 2009. See
Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors
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and amended those sections that would have granted Google
sole control over orphan works.133 It stipulated that the “power
to act with respect to the exploitation of [orphan works] . . .
under the Amended Settlement will be delegated to an
independent fiduciary.”134 The fiduciary would act as a trustee
and would contract, on behalf of the unclaimed works, with
companies that wished to digitize these works.135 Therefore,
under the amended agreement, companies other than Google
would have the opportunity to digitize orphan works, whereas
the original agreement gave these rights only to Google,
eliminating any potential competitive advantage.136
Google Books provides a good example of how a webbased business can use the unique capabilities of the Internet
to expand a well-established business platform. Google
attempted to garner a settlement that not only would have
given it sole control of an entire category of literature—orphan
works—but also would have imposed a heavy burden on its
competitors that sought to reach an analogous agreement.137 As
a result, Google raised the eyebrows of antitrust enforcers and
attracted heavy criticism. But once again, that criticism,
exemplified by the DOJ’s brief, relied on antitrust violations
resulting from combination and contract, not unilateral
anticompetitive conduct.138
3. Intel Litigation—2009
Although Google seems to have escaped antitrust
liability under Section 2, other new-economy firms have been
successfully sued for Section 2 violations. A recent example is
the New York State Attorney General’s suit against Intel Corp.
Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2009), available at
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/agreement.
133
Brad Stone & Michael Helft, Google and Partners Revise Terms of Digital
Book Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at B2.
134
Amended Settlement Agreement at sec. 6.2(b)(iii), Authors Guild, No. 05CV-8136-DC, available at http://books.google.com/googlebooks/agreement.
135
Stone & Helft, supra note 133.
136
Id.
137
See Grimmelman, supra note 122, at 14. Professor Grimmelman argues
that, although the settlement agreement did not explicitly prevent others from
implementing a book scanning program and seeking licenses independently, the
transactional costs associated therewith would have precluded any such effort, while
Google would take advantage of a settlement giving it clean release and an instantly
negotiated position. Id.
138
DOJ Brief, supra note 118, at 17 (citing violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1, which
outlaws collective action).

750

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:2

Filed on November 3, 2009, the attorney general’s complaint
alleged that Intel illegally monopolized the microprocessor
market.139 Specifically, the complaint alleged that Intel abused
its 80% market share of the microprocessor market by using
“threats and coercion, bribing and bullying to preserve its
market dominance.”140 In so doing, the complaint contended,
Intel anticompetitively strengthened its position in the market
by preventing computer manufacturers (such as Dell) from
installing microprocessors manufactured by Intel rivals (such
as Advanced Micro Devices).141
The allegations in New York’s suit are certainly serious.
Intel argued that its conduct benefitted consumers by providing
lower prices and promoting efficient innovation.142 This
argument highlights the difficulty of Section 2 enforcement in
high-technology markets. Nevertheless, the allegations
represent the nature of anticompetitive conduct typical of
successful Section 2 claims. In fact, Intel eventually settled the
suit—and others based on similar impermissible conduct—for
$1.25 billion.143 While the Intel litigation is a good example of
high-technology Section 2 enforcement, it falls short of showing
how like claims would be levied against web-based businesses
like Google, whose anticompetitive conduct is more ambiguous
and whose business takes place in a far more innovative
environment.
III.

APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES TO EMONOPOLIES

Antitrust enforcement of new-economy markets faces
obstacles for various reasons, ranging from the industry’s
dynamic nature to the antitrust enforcement regime’s relative
inexperience in the industry.144 Further complications arise
139

See generally Complaint, New York v. Intel Corp., No. 09-CV-827 (D. Del.
filed Nov. 3, 2009), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/nov/
NYAG_v_Intel_COMPLAINT_FINAL.pdf.
140
Id. ¶ 9.
141
Ashlee Vance, State Accuses Intel in an Antitrust Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2009, at B1.
142
Id.
143
Press Release, Intel Inc., AMD and Intel Announce Settlement of All
Antitrust and IP Disputes (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/
releases/2009/20091112corp_a.htm?iid=pr1_releasepri_20091112ra.
144
See Piraino, supra note 104, at 69-71. Piraino argues that antitrust
enforcement may not be apt for high technology markets because the “pace of
technological change is so swift, and so transforming, that no firm can hold monopoly
power in a high technology market for a meaningful period,” id. at 70, and that “courts
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from the Internet’s model of free, as it is incongruent with the
underlying rationale of antitrust law. Antitrust law stems from
the idea that competition in a relevant market requires
potential competitors to make products at a minimal input cost,
and at a price likely to attract consumers—all while turning a
profit.145 Internet businesses’ model of free, on the other hand,
operates mostly on advertising revenue with near-zero
production costs.146 This translates to no cost for the consumer.
Therefore, the traditional model of antitrust—where economic
effects like pricing take center stage—is seemingly inapplicable
when confronting an Internet business unlikely to impose
abusive price restrictions on consumers.
Of course, a distinction must be made in the ability to
impose price restrictions between the impact on consumers and
the impact on customers. The customer of a search engine is
not a web user. The contention that Google—or any other
eMonopoly—operates entirely on free is a mischaracterization
of the industry. If this were the case, and there were no
revenue generating component, there would be no desire to
ensure free competition in the first place. Rather, Google
operates as a “multi-sided platform,” providing “goods or
services to two or more distinct groups of customers who need
each other in some way and who rely on the platform to
intermediate transactions between them.”147
Advertisers are the customers of a web-service provider,
and it is advertising space and other for-pay services148 offered
by these Internet businesses that give rise to the threat of
anticompetitive and abusive conduct. But a potential advertiser
would not allot substantial expense for advertising space on
Google just because it is available. Rather, an advertiser
invests substantial advertising expenses on those sites that
offer the broadest exposure. Therefore, advertisers will
intuitively prefer sites with a wider market share of popular,
free online services. As a result, a business that offers one
component, infinite in supply and at no cost (i.e., a search
engine, e-mail, instant messaging, etc.), uses the dominant
and antitrust enforcement agencies” simply know too little about the economic
implications of these businesses. Id. at 69.
145
SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 21, at 7.
146
See Anderson, supra note 11 (“[T]he incremental cost of serving one more
Web page to one more user is almost nothing—and falling as technology gets cheaper.”).
147
Evans, supra note 1, at 292-93.
148
Take, for example, the profits that would be generated under the Google
Books Settlement Agreement. See supra Part II.B.2.
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market share in that component to influence the value of an
unrelated component that is in finite supply (i.e., advertising
space) and for which it can charge a price.149 In other words, it is
a website’s popularity with consumers that makes it wealthy,
not its popularity with advertisers.150 As a result,
monopolization of the former threatens monopolization of the
latter.
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits the
unilateral monopolization of a relevant market by means of
exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct.151 But due to the
peculiarities of the Google monopoly—particularly with respect
to the means by which market power has been amassed—
traditional Section 2 actions will have difficulty surviving
motions to dismiss. To present a cognizable claim under Section
2, plaintiffs must show not only monopoly power in a relevant
market, but also the “willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.”152 Plaintiffs have struggled to establish relevant
markets in the context of search-engine monopolization and
distinguish unlawful anticompetitive conduct from lawful
acquisition of market power,153 both of which suggest hampered
potential for antitrust enforcement.
This part will look at how the development of hightechnology antitrust application and the nature of Internet
business pose a problem for Section 2 enforcement against
unilateral eMonopolies by demonstrating the difficulty of
satisfying the essential elements of a Section 2 claim.
A.

Relevant Market

The first issue in relevant market analysis is how the
concept of interchangeability carries over to Internet
149

See Mike Masnick, The Grand Unified Theory on the Economics of Free,
TECHDIRT.COM (May 3, 2007, 12:23 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20070503/
012939.shtml.
150
Cf. Lastowka, supra note 89, at 1330-32 (explaining the Google founders’
understanding that a successful search engine tailors to the needs of the consumer first).
151
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
152
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 407 (2004) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
153
See, e.g., Live Universe, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 304 Fed. App’x 554 (9th Cir.
2008); Person v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-7297, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47920 (N.D. Cal.
June 25, 2007); Kinderstart.com, LLC, v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-7297, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22637 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); see also infra Parts III.A.1, III.A.3.
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businesses, many of which provide their services free of charge.
Some courts have held that, where services are provided for
free, the absence of sales precludes the existence of a relevant
market.154 Other courts have been less restrictive in their
interpretation, holding that relevant markets can exist in the
absence of sales where services are provided for free.155
As noted above, the free services offered by websites like
Google, including e-mail, maps, and search, are not the only
products offered. On the contrary, what these companies sell is
advertising space, a limited resource that rises in value in
direct proportion to the popularity of the free, infinite
resources.156 In this regard, antitrust plaintiffs have argued that
search advertising is a relevant market “because there are no
effective competitive alternatives to search advertising
available to search advertisers.”157 Moreover, they argue, search
advertising is unique compared to other advertising because
search advertising is married to search queries in a way that
allows an unparalleled level of relevance in the advertising
displayed on the webpage.158 In other words, search advertising
displays advertisements calculated to appeal to specific users
because they are generated by a manifestation of that user’s
interest—the search query. Other forms of advertising do not
have such fine-tuned mechanism for identifying consumer
interests.
At least one court has rejected the argument that search
and search advertising are, in and of themselves, relevant
markets. In Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., the plaintiff
alleged that Google had violated Section 2 by attempting to
monopolize two distinct markets: the Search Market and the
Search Ad Market.159 The Northern District of California
disposed of the Search Market argument on the grounds that
search is only a gateway to revenue from other sources and
154

See, e.g., Person, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47920, at *11 n.6 (acknowledging
the rejection of the search market as a relevant market); Kinderstart.com, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22637, at *15 (declining to define a relevant market in terms of search
engines, noting that there is “no authority indicating that antitrust law concerns itself
with competition in the provision of free services”).
155
See, e.g., Live Universe, 304 Fed. App’x at 556 (acknowledging the existence
of defendant’s dominant market share in the social networking website market).
156
See Masnick, supra note 149.
157
Complaint at ¶ 61, TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d
370 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-CV-1400), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/
district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01400/340565/1/0.pdf.
158
Id.
159
Kinderstart.com, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637, at *12-13.
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that no revenue is derived directly from search.160 Because the
service is free and nothing is being sold, the court held that the
plaintiff could not demonstrate a “grouping of sales” necessary
to establish a relevant market.161
The court disposed of the Search Ad Market theory as
well, holding that search advertising is too narrow a definition
of a relevant market because it is no different than general
advertising; therefore, the two can be reasonably
interchanged.162 The court reasoned that search and general
advertising were indistinct because an advertiser can simply
choose to post advertisements independently of any search.163
There is not much judicial analysis of search and search
advertising as a relevant market under Section 2. The search
market—and the fact that it is free—represents a uniquely
difficult application. Although a product exists that can be
interchanged by users, the absence of sales may make that fact
irrelevant. As the Kinderstart.com court noted, some courts
characterize relevant markets in terms of “grouping of sales”
and “buyers.”164 This definition could indicate that sales or
exchanges are required for a relevant market. But this remains
an open question.
As for the search ad market, it is likely that future
courts will not follow Kinderstart.com’s narrow interpretation
of relevant markets to search advertising. If the underlying
limit of a relevant market is the set of products that are
“reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same
purposes,”165 and in this context, the consumer is an advertiser,
there may be weight to the argument that the search ad results
are programmed differently and provide a substantially
different product—namely, results catered to the interests of
the user versus general advertising.166 On the other hand, the
argument can be made that search advertising is simply
superior (as opposed to different) and, therefore, the court in
160

Id. at *15.
Id.
162
Id. at *16.
163
Id.
164
See id. at *14 (quoting Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421,
1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A ‘market’ is any grouping of sales whose sellers, if unified by a
monopolist or a hypothetical cartel, would have market power in dealing with any
group of buyers.” (emphasis added))).
165
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
166
See Complaint at ¶ 61, TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp.
2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-CV-1400), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/
federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01400/340565/1/0.pdf.
161
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Kinderstart.com was right to reject a distinction between
search advertising and general advertising.167
Given the limited litigation on search and search
advertising as relevant markets, it remains unclear how they
will be interpreted in the future. One suggested approach has
been to define relevant markets based on a distinction between
markets for data and markets for the expanded use of data.168
Commentators have argued that drawing this distinction
would appropriately acknowledge the function of Internet
business and, in so doing, identify markets actionable under
Section 2.169 It would seem, however, that this approach, which
defines markets abstractly based on the subtle nuances of
Internet business, would be just as problematic as definitions
based on the subtle differences between search and search
advertising. Regardless of the approach, application of this
Section 2 element poses a potential obstacle to future antitrust
enforcement against eMonopolies.
B.

Monopoly Power

After defining the relevant market, a Section 2 claim
requires a showing that the alleged monopolist possesses
monopoly power in the relevant market sufficient control that
market.170 Although market share is a powerful indicator of
monopoly power in a relevant market, other characteristics can
contribute to a finding of monopoly power, such as the freedom
of entry into the field.171
1. Market Share
By all accounts, Google has a dominant share of the
Internet-search market.172 As discussed above, the general view
is that “high market share, though it may ordinarily raise an
inference of monopoly power, will not do so in a market” where

167

See Kinderstart.com, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637, at *16.
Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An
Expanded Vision of Relevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 772-73 (2010).
169
Id. at 773, 785-86. In addition, the authors point to investigatory precedent
to defend the position of defining markets based on data collection. See id. at 787-92.
170
See E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 391 (monopoly power is “the
power to control prices or exclude competition”).
171
See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
172
See supra note 17.
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the alleged monopolist cannot exert market control.173 But
Google’s share of the Internet-search market is nearly 80%.174
This market share, although not a complete domination of the
search market, embodies overwhelming market power given
that Google’s nearest competitor is Yahoo! at a paltry 9%.175 In
light of the Google search engine’s strong user base and vitality
to the overall structure of e-commerce,176 such a
disproportionate market share may very well indicate
monopoly power.
2. Barriers to Entry
Although market share alone may be sufficient to
establish monopoly power in a relevant market,177 market share
can be misleading because it represents today’s reality without
consideration of contrary developments tomorrow.178 Other
factors thus become relevant in the analysis as well. One
intriguing concept in determining the existence of monopoly
power is the presence of barriers to entry. A barrier to entry is
essentially a characteristic or structural reality of the relevant
market that prevents emerging entrants from establishing a
foothold, and, as a result, protects an entrenched competitor’s
dominant position.179
In United States v. Microsoft, the court examined the
barriers to entry in the software market.180 The court explained
how the software industry is subject to a “chicken-and-egg”
scenario that precludes emerging entrants from entering the
field.181 According to the court, because most consumers prefer
173

Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Res., Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 366 (9th Cir. 1988)
(internal citations omitted).
174
Bing’s Loss, Google’s Gain, supra note 17.
175
Id.
176
See Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637, at *11
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (plaintiff argued that Google’s search engine is an “essential facility”
for offering, marketing and delivering services over the Internet and Google’s conduct
in administering the search engine affected competition).
177
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
178
See Ball Mem’l Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir.
1986) (“Market share reflects current sales, but today’s sales do not always indicate
power over sales and price tomorrow.”); Hunt-Wesson Food, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc.,
627 F.2d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Blind reliance upon market share, divorced from
commercial reality, could give a misleading picture of a firm’s actual ability to control
prices or exclude competition.”).
179
See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
180
Id.
181
Id.
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operating systems that already support a large number of
applications, and because most manufacturers will develop
applications supported by only the most popular operating
systems, Microsoft’s current market control will only
perpetuate and expand.182 A competitor would not be able to
muscle into the market because application developers would
not write applications for their operating systems as there are
no consumers. Likewise, no consumers would purchase the
operating system because it does not have applications written
for its use.
This phenomenon is clearly present in the case of a
Google eMonopoly and may in fact be even more restrictive than
Microsoft’s monopoly against potential competitors. In the case
of an eMonopoly that predicates its dominant market position on
free online services through a website, there is a substantial
likelihood that the website will have a large user base. With a
large user base comes more advertising revenue. This finite
market for revenue-generating advertising is contingent upon
the value of the unlimited free component183—the very same
component over which the eMonopoly already possesses a
monopoly market share. Therefore, an emerging entrant will not
have the opportunity to generate sufficient user traffic to
overcome the entrenched competitor’s dominance.184 Moreover, at
least in the case of Google, the predicate monopoly over search
has arguably been achieved through a substantially superior
product.185 Although there is a barrier to entry precluding a
competitor from establishing a foothold in the market, the
barrier was erected through superiority, not an attempt to
exclude a rival. Therefore, the barrier may not be an
impermissible result of anticompetitive behavior.186
C.

Anticompetitive Conduct

The third element of a Section 2 claim presents the
biggest obstacle when applied to Internet-based monopolies
like Google. Because anticompetitive conduct must be
182

Id.
See Masnick, supra note 149.
184
TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 09-CV-1400 at ¶ 67 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/newyork/nysdce/1:2009cv01400/340565/1/0.pdf.
185
See infra Part III.C.
186
See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
(1985) (prohibiting exclusion of a rival only when doing so achieves no efficiency).
183
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aggressively competitive (directly impeding the success of
competitors), as opposed to passively competitive (impeding the
success of competitors indirectly by having a better product),
the conduct of a major online monopoly does not fall clearly
within the definition of anticompetitive conduct.
To illustrate this concept, consider Google’s market
share in Internet search and search advertising. Assuming,
under the above analysis, that Google does have the power to
shape the e-commerce marketplace,187 this lopsided market
share only satisfies the first prong of a Section 2 claim. The
plaintiff would still have to show anticompetitive conduct.
In Google’s case, anticompetitive conduct would be
difficult to establish because Google’s dominance is the result of
an arguably superior product, which is perfectly permissible
under Section 2 jurisprudence.188 At the time Google launched
in 1997, the search-engine market was infested with inefficient
systems that failed to provide users with relevant or useful
results.189 Instead, early search engines offered search results
linked to advertisers.190 Google’s founders brought a new
philosophy to search engines that revolutionized the industry.191
Google veered from the default algorithm approach to parsing a
website’s relevance, instead using a formula that calculated the
frequency with which a website is hyperlinked as a barometer
for relevance.192 The PageRank system “made Google’s search
results noticeably better and allowed users to obtain more
relevant results in response to their search terms.”193
Therefore, we see that Google has not developed its
dominant market share of the search market by illegal
anticompetitive means. Rather, through its superior product,
Google has “acquire[d] monopoly power by establishing an
infrastructure that renders [it] uniquely suited to serve [its]
customers.”194 As a result, advertisers naturally gravitated to
Google.195 Unfortunately for Google’s competitors, the antitrust
187

See supra Part III.B.
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
189
Lastowka, supra note 89, at 1335.
190
Id. at 1335-36.
191
See id. at 1337.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 407 (2004).
195
See Lastowka, supra note 89, at 1339-40 (discussing the development of
Google’s advertising platform and resulting advertising revenue).
188
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laws do not prohibit “compet[ition], whether against the
competitive fringe in its monopoly market or against potential
competitors, as vigorously as a firm in an ordinary competitive
market . . . [,] provided it doesn’t employ tactics calculated to
drive an equally” equipped competitor from the market.196
That being said, a large focus of antitrust in the new
economy is the ability of a firm with monopoly share to ward off
new entrants and prevent efficient challenges to a monopoly in
another market.197 In this sense, it is possible for Google to take
its dominant market share in search, which is free to the
consumer, and link it to another service. In so doing, Google
would effectively bar competitors that do not enjoy a dominant,
preexisting client base from challenging a potential Google
monopoly in that ancillary service.198
Would Google’s attempt to link its preexisting search
market dominance with a secondary digital service, such as a
potential Google Books Project, constitute anticompetitive
conduct rendering the monopoly illegitimate?199 Generally,
conduct will be deemed anticompetitive if it negatively effects
the competitive opportunities of rivals and lacks an
independent business justification that furthers competition on
the merits.200
Two Section 2 cases shed light on the practice of linking
a new service to preexisting market power. In Live Universe,
Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that MySpace
deactivated the embedded links on its social-networking site
that led users to the plaintiff’s networking site.201 The plaintiff

196

Posner, supra note 7, at 931.
Id. at 931-32.
198
See Gary L. Reback, Remarks at the New York Law School Conference: D
Is for Digitize (Oct. 10, 2009), video available at http://www.nyls.edu/centers/harlan_
scholar_centers/institute_for_information_law_and_policy/events/d_is_for_digitize/program).
199
See Stone & Mouawad, supra note 82 (quoting Samuel R. Miller, antitrust
lawyer at Sidley Austin) (“Every time Google makes another acquisition, it only
reinforces the argument that they are basically trying to acquire other companies that
may present potential competition to their core dominance in paid search.”).
200
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32
(1985); see, e.g., Coal. for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495,
503-09 (9th Cir. 2010) (defendant’s predatory litigation activity aimed at coercing
plaintiff to perpetuate defendant’s role as exclusive regulator of the dot-com domain
name market by awarding defendant contract extension without any competitive
bidding was found to be anticompetitive conduct because it lacked any independent
business justification).
201
Live Universe, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 304 Fed. App’x 554, 556-57 (9th Cir. 2008).
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alleged that this was a refusal-to-deal202 course of conduct and
constituted anticompetitive exclusion of a competitor.203 The
Ninth Circuit disagreed and held that MySpace’s decisions
concerning the content that it displayed on its site were not
made for any purpose beyond maximization of profits.204
Therefore, despite MySpace’s concession that it had monopoly
market share in social networking,205 MySpace’s conduct in
administering and censoring that monopoly was not subject to
antitrust oversight absent a claim that the conduct lacked an
independent business justification.206
In United States v. Microsoft, the government accused
Microsoft of anticompetitive monopolization in bundling its selfdesigned Internet browser, Internet Explorer, with its already
popular Windows operating system.207 Microsoft was found to
have an overwhelming dominant market share: 95% of the
defined market of Intel-compatible PC operating systems.208
Because Microsoft prohibited removal of Internet Explorer from
its operating interface, computer manufactures were given no
choice but to promulgate the use of Microsoft’s browser.209 By
mandating retention of its own browser and effectively barring
the use of rival browsers (specifically the Netscape-designed
Navigator browser) Microsoft could avoid the threat of other
browser manufacturers amassing enough usage to attract
developers to other operating systems.210
The D.C. Circuit concluded that Microsoft’s conduct had
an anticompetitive effect because manufacturers had a
disincentive to install rival browsers.211 This effect, the court
noted, “reduce[d] the usage share of rival browsers not by
making Microsoft’s own browser more attractive to consumers
but, rather, by discouraging [manufacturers] from distributing

202

Refusal to deal is a theory of liability wherein a monopolist, under certain
circumstances, cannot refuse to deal with a rival. See DOJ, COMPETITION AND
MONOPOLY, supra note 63, at 119-20.
203
Live Universe, 304 Fed. App’x at 556.
204
Id. at 557.
205
Id. at 556.
206
Id. at 557.
207
United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
208
Id. at 54.
209
Id. at 60-61.
210
Id. at 60.
211
Id. at 61. The Court accepted the manufacturers’ claim that dual installation
of rival browsers would lead to user confusion, which would increase the manufacturers’
support costs when they inevitably dealt with associated consumer inquiries. Id.
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rival products”212 and, in the absence of any justification beyond
preserving operating system monopoly, Microsoft’s conduct was
most decidedly anticompetitive.213 This case provides a useful
look at a high-technology firm linking a preexisting market
share with burgeoning aspects of its overall business scheme.
Microsoft was found liable under Section 2 because it took
affirmative steps to reduce its rivals’ market share with no
independent business justification of furthering competition on
the merits.
Live Universe and Microsoft do not bode well for
antitrust
enforcement
against
modern
eMonopolies,
notwithstanding the distinct advantage firms like Google
would possess. It is unlikely that Google’s conduct would be
considered tantamount to Microsoft’s “unlawful campaign to
eliminate competition, deter innovation, and restrict consumer
choice.”214
First, by supplementing its menu of services and
expanding on its dominant control of web traffic, Google would
be doing nothing more than controlling the content on its own
web pages in an effort to maximize profits. As in Live Universe,
without a showing that Google is acting contrary or beyond this
objective, no anticompetitive conduct will be found.215 Generally,
courts refuse to find anticompetitive conduct where the
defendant acts to promote its own competitive appeal.216
Similarly, Google would not be forcing anyone’s hand in
mandating use of the ancillary service. Microsoft was
admonished for prohibiting removal of an application from an
operating system of which it had a monopoly market share217
because, by doing so, it prevented rival software developers
from offering their own browsers. As a platform provider,
Microsoft could impermissibly control the availability of
competitor-developed applications because it controlled the
212

Id. at 65.
United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 66.
214
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Assistant Attorney
General Joel I. Klein, Filing of Antitrust Suit Against Microsoft (May 18, 1998),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1998/1770.pdf.
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See Live Universe, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 304 Fed. App’x 554, 557 (9th Cir.
2008).
216
See, e.g., Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of
Durango, 582 F.3d 1216, 1225 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that a refusal to deal with
plaintiff was justifiable because it sought to “avoid an unprofitable relationship, and
that the [defendant] pursued the course it did to protect and maximize its chances of
profitability in the short-term.”).
217
United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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medium by which those applications were delivered—the
operating system.218 Google, on the other hand, would be
supplementing its own online services. It would be providing its
own applications to its own platform, unlike Microsoft’s vertical
restriction that allowed it to control the service that gave life to
Where
Microsoft
mandated
competitors’
products.219
implementation of its product, Google would be merely making
its services available to anyone who chooses to use it. Those
that choose not to use it can simply use the Internet without
going through Google.220
An argument can be made, however, that Google, in
returning results for its own services more favorably than those
of competitors, is eschewing its PageRank search formula and
promoting its own welfare anticompetitively.221 If Google is
indeed promoting its own self-interest at the expense of evenhanded application of its PageRank formula, any resulting
monopoly in ancillary services would stem from something
beyond its superior product.
In this case, Google may be exposed to liability under
the essential-facilities doctrine. The essential-facilities doctrine
imposes liability when a firm in control of an essential facility
denies a second firm access to a service necessary for
competition and accessible only through that essential
facility.222 It requires a showing that (1) a monopolist had
control of an essential facility, (2) a competitor lacks the ability
to duplicate the facility, (3) the monopolist denied use of the
facility to the competitor, and (4) the facility could be
reasonably provided.223 The argument would allege that
Google’s search engine, powered by PageRank, represents an
essential facility for offering, marketing and delivering services
218

See Philip J. Weiser, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T,
Microsoft, and Beyond, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 271 (2009) (examining the antitrust
implications of the tensions between producers of applications and the producers of the
platforms on which applications are run).
219
See id.
220
Vogelstein, supra note 18. In fact, Google CEO Eric Schmidt contends that
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Microsoft’s “misdeeds.” Id.
221
Cf. GARY L. REBACK, FREE THE MARKET!: WHY ONLY GOVERNMENT CAN KEEP
THE MARKETPLACE COMPETITIVE 160-61 (2009) (explaining the allegations that Microsoft, in
the 1990s, used its dominant position in the operating system market to anticompetitively
enable Microsoft software developers to obtain an advantage over competitors).
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Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S.
Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 446 (2002).
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MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
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over the Internet.224 By refusing to grant certain competitors
access to the benefits of PageRank, the agreement goes, Google
is denying those competitors access to the facility. Given
Google’s predominance in search and its large user base, rivals
would be unable to duplicate its utility.
This argument will fall flat as well. Courts impose
liability based on the essential-facilities doctrine infrequently
because it is difficult to characterize a facility as truly
essential.225 A facility is essential “only if control of the facility
carries with it the power to eliminate competition.”226 Thus, “a
plaintiff must show more than inconvenience, or even some
economic loss; he must show that an alternative to the facility
is not feasible.”227 Although Google’s PageRank-powered search
engine has been proven to be the superior alternative, it is not
the only feasible alternative. A competitor can use any number
of other search engines to expose Internet users to its product.
Therefore, although Google’s refusal to grant a competitor
equal access to the PageRank system might reduce the
competitor’s expectant profits, it does not eliminate
competition; as a result, it will not trigger liability under the
essential-facilities doctrine.228
Google’s rapid development of services—a characteristic
of the eMonopoly environment—does not naturally implicate
anticompetitive conduct. Innovation in Internet services is a
fast-paced phenomenon; therefore, it is very easy for an
entrenched firm to legally pursue expansion and efficiency to
strengthen its dominant position.229 Innovation gives a web-based
business the ability to maximize its efficiency and expand its
user base by providing products of increasing quality at
marginally increasing costs.230 Therefore, Google is arguably not
engaging in anticompetitive conduct because its goal is merely to

224

See Kinderstart.com, LLC, v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-7297, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22637, at *11 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
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Pitofsky et al., supra note 222, at 449.
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Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1990).
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See Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 545-46 (stating that Alaska Airlines’
exclusive control of computerized reservation systems did not implicate essential
facilities doctrine because, although control of the system gave them a monetary
advantage over competitors, it did not grant them the power to entirely eliminate
competition given the existence of other, albeit inferior, alternatives).
229
Piraino, supra note 104, at 84-85.
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provide useful and diverse services for Internet users.231 Any
resulting monopoly is simply a natural byproduct.
IV.

FUTURE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT OF EMONOPOLIES

The antitrust enforcement regime has several avenues
of recourse to prevent an eMonopoly from escaping unilateral
antitrust scrutiny. But the peculiarities of the eMonopoly
environment, as applied to the conduct of a unilateral
monopolist, impede effective enforcement. This suggests that
an unconventional approach may be required and that
nontraditional considerations be taken into account.
A.

The Waiting Game—The Naturally Correcting Market

One of the most fervent arguments in modern antitrust
enforcement is that free markets will eventually correct
themselves and if left alone by government regulators and
enforcers, will often reallocate resources efficiently.232 As a
result, “any company’s attempt to secure market power would
most likely be defeated by other profit-maximizers,” whether
they are “new entrants or existing competitors.”233
This argument is appealing to the new-economy
markets in which eMonopolies operate because of the
propensity for fast and efficient technological turnover, which
can quickly relegate a one-time monopolist to a second-tier
player. Oftentimes, “the pace of technological change is so
swift, and so transforming, that no firm can hold monopoly
power in a high technology market for a meaningful period.”234
The Microsoft case235 is illustrative. At the time of the
government’s suit, Microsoft was found to possess 95% market
share of the defined market of Intel-compatible PC operating
systems.236 But at the dawn of the twenty-first century, before
the Microsoft appeal was even concluded, technology and
Internet dependence were pushing PCs out as the dominant
mode of computing. The trend moved towards non-PC Internet
231

Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Cutis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004) (explaining that the purpose of the anticompetitive conduct requirement is
“[t]o safeguard the incentive to innovate”).
232
Stucke, supra note 15, at 539-40.
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Piraino, supra note 104, at 70.
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United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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devices eschewing physical hard drives and operating systems
for the Internet-based data storage and application services
that Google exemplifies.237 In fact, by 2002, it was estimated
that Microsoft produced less than 50% of the devices providing
Internet access.238 Indeed, Microsoft currently finds itself as a
spectator to the growth of Google, which is quickly expanding
and dominating the modern high-technology marketplaces.239 As
a result of the naturally occurring innovation and turnover
present in high-technology markets, antitrust suits could be
faced with the threat that, “[b]y the time [a] case is over, the
court may be asked to restructure an industry that has already
restructured itself.”240
This same capacity for innovation and quick, efficient
modernization, however, will ultimately preclude a naturallycorrecting-market strategy. The main reason is that a
dominant firm in today’s Internet-based economy will continue
to dominate rather than yield to the next wave of technological
advancement. Google continues to grow and expand.241 What
was originally a search engine is now a search engine, e-mail
service, news outlet, and web-browser developer among other
services.242 In fact, as technology made its most recent evolution
into mobile computing and mobile Internet access, Google
adapted accordingly and unveiled its own mobile computing
device—an attempt to retain dominance as computing shifts
from one generation to the next.243 The same characteristics
that erected a barrier to entry for emerging competitors in
established markets will carry over to emerging markets, and
passive resistance will only result in further entrenchment.244
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Proactive Attempted-Monopolization Litigation

If waiting will only exacerbate the problem, perhaps
Google’s expansion into other areas could give rise to an
attempted monopolization claim.245 As discussed above,
attempted-monopolization is present when there is a “dangerous
probability” of eventual monopoly power as a result of
anticompetitive conduct.246 The threat remains that Google could
use its dominant position to expand into other areas while
competitors would be precluded from doing so.247 Not only would
Google benefit from the resources it could employ in research
and development, but it would benefit from an established
preexisting platform to offer its new service. Given Google’s
preexisting user base and reputation for offering unique,
efficient web-based services, it would enjoy large immediate
exposure as well as a level of immediate legitimacy. This would
most certainly give them an advantage over competitors, which
would only perpetuate their dominance over the Internet.
However, modern antitrust jurisprudence does not
preclude a firm from benefitting from a permissibly obtained
competitive advantage.248 Indeed, “[i]t is the possibility of success
in the marketplace, attributable to superior performance that
provides the incentives on which the proper functioning of our
competitive economy rests.”249 Therefore, it would be unfair and
unsupported to penalize Google for taking the intuitive step of
expanding on what has proven successful.
Attempted monopolization based on illegal bundling or
tying is another possible route for antitrust litigation. Tying
occurs when a firm “sell[s] one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product, or at least agrees that [it] will not purchase that
product from any other supplier.”250 A violation of Section 2
under a tying theory requires the sale of
two separate products or services . . . [whereby] the sale or
agreement to sell one product or service is conditioned on the
purchase of another . . . [and where] the seller has sufficient
59, 107 (2008) (“Given the information asymmetries and barriers to entry, the market
appears unlikely to ‘heal itself’ . . . .”).
245
Vogelstein, supra note 18.
246
See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
247
Krazit, supra note 86.
248
PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 240, at 16.
249
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979).
250
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
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economic power in the market for the tying product to enable it to
restrain trade in the market for the tied product . . . .251

Fortunately for Google, several factors bar this theory
from prohibiting its expansion into, and offering of, new
Internet services. First, as discussed above, Google’s services
are offered for free, and no consumer is placed in the position
where the purchase of A necessitates the purchase of
B. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Google is not
bundling its services to the point of coercion. As Google CEO
Eric Schmidt points out, Google has made it a conscious
business strategy not to mandate use of its services.252 Internet
users are free to avoid the use of Google and its services; it is
reliance on their superior product that allows them to maintain
dominance. Finally, the practice of combining its services may
simply provide Google with an added economic bonus based on
an efficient interconnected business model, unencumbered by
high marginal costs.253 Therefore, when a Google search turns
up results for Google Maps, or Google News, or even a video on
Google-owned YouTube, it would not constitute tying. Google
would be merely offering the user the services and not
mandating its selection.
Nevertheless, future antitrust enforcement against
Google should focus on its attempts to monopolize markets as
opposed to those markets over which it has already established
monopoly power. By focusing on its future conduct and
remaining vigilant, regulators can avoid the assumption that
Google has developed its monopoly based solely on its superior
product and instead catch any of its anticompetitive behavior.
C.

Sociopolitical Considerations

The difficulty of traditional antitrust enforcement of
eMonopolies suggests that the economic effects of antitrust are
not the only considerations that should be taken into account.
Noneconomic considerations should be made a component of
antitrust analysis as well.254 As Robert Pitofsky observed, “It is
bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political
251

1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 177
(6th ed. 2007).
252
Vogelstein, supra note 18.
253
See Evans, supra note 1, at 304.
254
Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1080 (1979).
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values in interpreting the antitrust laws.”255 Indeed, as the
Supreme Court has noted, the antitrust laws “provid[e] an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic,
political and social institutions”256 not limited to economic
markets. Given the difficulties of antitrust application to
eMonopolies, socioeconomic considerations may well provide an
alternative means of checking unilateral domination of the
Internet economy.
Specifically, the social effects of a consolidated Internet
media must play a role in finding antitrust violations.257 In
applying the “rule of reason”—which weighs the
anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects of monopolistic
conduct258—the sociopolitical goal of maintaining firm diversity
in media can provide antitrust enforcers with a legitimate
foothold to attack Internet monopolies. Moreover, the
potentially detrimental privacy concerns associated with
domination by an eMonopoly like Google provide yet another
anticompetitive effect that should be considered.
1. Media Consolidation
An important caveat to antitrust analysis in the context
of eMonopolies lies in the nature of the business. Much of the
content offered by Internet-based monopolies revolves around
consolidation of information and digital media.259 Given the
increasing access to the Internet260 and the consolidation of
services on a limited number of websites, media consolidation
is a real possibility.
Suppose a single Internet service provider, in the Google
mold, builds a web-based conglomerate that has an exclusive
license to display the content of the top-twenty American
newspapers. The exclusivity of the agreement, under which a
licensor has granted a right to display certain material

255

Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051,
1051 (1979).
256
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
257
See Pitofsky, supra note 255, at 1051 (“It is bad history, bad policy, and
bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws.”).
258
DOJ & FTC, PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION, supra note 36, at 9.
259
See Wellstone, supra note 123, at 551; see also supra Part II.B.2
(discussing the Google Books Project).
260
See supra note 9.
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exclusively to one licensee,261 implicates antitrust laws because
the potential output and price abuses may adversely affect on
competition.262 A restraint in a licensing agreement (such as the
restraint of exclusivity) requires an evaluation under the “rule
of reason,”263 which necessitates a showing that the “particular
contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and
anticompetitive.”264
Any anticompetitive effects that may result from this
(hypothetically) broad exclusive license could be justified if the
restraint is necessary to achieve legitimate procompetitive
effects.265 But where an exclusive agreement of such breadth
involves the licensing of ideas, information, and news, it has
the potential to directly affect consumers—implicating
concerns beyond economics. When diversity of ideas and
opinions is so restricted and media access is whittled to a single
source—producing a single stream of thought—there may be
lasting effects on the efficient administration of a
representative democracy,266 which relies on popular access to
diverse sources of information.267
Although this appears to be an issue of free speech and
free press implicated by the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, First Amendment protections apply only against
government action.268 Therefore, where the restriction is
imposed by private contract, the First Amendment does not

261

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 4.1.2 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter DOJ & FTC,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
262
Id. § 3.2.
263
Id. § 3.4.
264
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006). This “rule of reason” analysis
takes place in connection to a Section 1 claim.
265
DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 261, at § 3.4. Courts have
held that exclusive licensing agreements can enhance competition by reducing costs,
expediting contract negotiation, and by otherwise contributing to economic efficiency. See,
e.g., Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 321 (2d Cir. 2008).
266
See PORT ET AL., supra note 6, at 426.
267
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler (June 28, 1804), in 11 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 32, 33 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh
eds., 1904) (“Our first object should therefore be, to leave open to [man] all the avenues
to truth. The most effectual hitherto found, is the freedom of the press.”); see also
Wellstone, supra note 123, at 552.
268
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737
(1996) (“[T]he First Amendment, the terms of which apply to governmental action,
ordinarily does not itself throw into constitutional doubt the decisions of private
citizens to permit, or to restrict, speech . . . .”).
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apply.269 Antitrust laws, on the other hand, apply almost
exclusively to private conduct and are therefore the only means
to avoid a detrimental effect on information access.270
The anticompetitive effects resulting from such a broad
exclusive agreement go beyond economics and enter the
sociopolitical realm—restricting access to diverse media and
limiting the available streams of ideas, which, in turn, can
hinder the functioning of the democratic process. Because these
consequences are so important and far-reaching, they should be
considered in balancing the anticompetitive consequences with
the procompetitive benefits.271
2. Privacy Concerns
Privacy concerns represent another effect of Internet
monopolization that warrant consideration under the “rule of
reason” analysis.272 The nature of Internet business requires user
input in return for a service; in the case of Google, a user inputs
a search query and is rewarded with search results. But to
provide web-based businesses with a basis to tailor appropriate
advertising, businesses collect enormous amounts of data about
users without their permission and, in many cases, without their
knowledge.273 Google has been accused of recording “all data
being transmitted over open Wi-Fi networks,” websites visited,
videos watched, and even every e-mail sent or received.274
The natural propensity for Internet businesses to rely
on users’ personal information raises a profound issue of
269

This would be so even if the restrictive decision took place within the
framework of a government-imposed regulatory regime. Id.
270
PORT ET AL., supra note 6, at 426. In addition to government enforcement,
the antitrust laws provide for a private right of action strengthening their weight
against efforts at web-based consolidation. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (“[A]ny person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States . . . .”).
271
See Pitofsky, supra note 254, at 1051 (“It is bad history, bad policy, and
bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws.”).
272
Recent scholarship has called for the consideration of privacy concerns in
antitrust analysis when defining relevant product markets. Cf. Harbour & Koslov,
supra note 168, at 793-97 (2010) (arguing for privacy-based relevant product markets
and insisting, abstractly, for inclusion of privacy in antitrust analysis by any means).
Privacy concerns were not considered for application in a rule of reason anticompetitive
conduct analysis.
273
Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 3 (2008).
274
See Complaint at ¶¶ 3-4, Stokes v. Google, No. CV-10-2306 (N.D. Cal. May
26, 2010); see also Reuters, States to Investigate Google Data Collection, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 2010.
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privacy. Indeed, the very scope of collected personal
information is vast. Consider that millions of searches are
recorded on Google every day; with each entry Google can
archive personal “interests, needs, desires, fears, pleasures,
and intentions,” as demonstrated by each search.275 This
collected personal information is a danger to personal privacy—
one that, some commentators argue, the current privacy
protection framework is not suited to cope.276
Given that monopoly share for a web-based business
relies on a monopoly-sized user base, it follows that those
companies with dominating user share will likewise pose the
biggest threat to privacy on the Internet. Accordingly, antitrust
analysis may offer a solution to the murky privacy concerns
raised by eMonopolies.
For example, much of the FTC investigation surrounding
Google’s merger with DoubleClick arose from the privacy
concerns raised by the merger. The concerns generally focused
on the fact that both companies dealt largely with online
advertising and relied to a large extent on collecting user
information. The fear was that combining the two sets of
personal information increased the potential that a large
number of Internet users would be subjected to privacy
invasion.277 In the end, the FTC refused to consider privacy
concerns as “the sole purpose of federal antitrust review of
mergers and acquisitions is to identify and remedy transactions
that harm competition.”278
Still, given the breadth of the privacy intrusions and the
inability of other areas to cope with the potential threat,
Section 2 claims of unilateral monopolization offer an
intriguing platform to address these concerns. Considering that
contemporary antitrust law focuses on consumer welfare—and
therefore looks at how certain conduct will affect the
consumer—it
makes
sense
that
consumer-welfare
considerations not be limited to economics.
Rather, antitrust review should take into account
normative factors and the overall impact an eMonopoly can
have on the lives of a consumer. Put simply, if an eMonopoly is
275

Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines,
2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1435 (2008).
276
See, e.g., id. at 1464 (“[C]urrent approaches [to solving Internet privacy
problems] are flawed and afford inadequate protection to search-engine users.”).
277
FTC on Google/DoubleClick, supra note 116, at 2, 12.
278
Id. at 2.
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allowed to dominate the digital markets, and its domination
relies on the collection and implementation of private personal
information, the growth of the eMonopoly will affect the
privacy of more and more individuals. As a result, consumers
may become wary of blindly providing personal information.
However unlikely, if manipulation of private information
continues, it could spell decreased reliance on Internet
businesses and an anticompetitively harmful effect on the
market as a whole.
V.

CONCLUSION

Application of federal antitrust laws to Internet-based
businesses poses a major problem. For a variety of reasons,
eMonopolies represent a unique context for contemporary
antitrust enforcement. This is particularly true with respect to
Section 2 unilateral monopolization claims. Rapid innovation and
technological advancement allow dominant players to rapidly
grow and expand, further entrenching their dominant position. In
addition, eMonopolies’ dominant positions are predicated on free
services, supported by a “multi-sided platform.”279 And therefore,
without a threat of consumer abuse, the consumer welfare goal of
antitrust legislation is inapplicable. Finally, as is the case with
Google, technological innovation tends to produce products that
are simply superior; consequently, any resulting monopoly would
not be impermissible.
Nevertheless, it is important that steps be taken to
prevent eMonopolies from abusing a legally obtained monopoly
in order to anticompetitively dominate other markets. Because
there is substantially limited regulation of the Internet in other
areas, antitrust may be the only existing solution.280 Therefore,
antitrust enforcement should adopt a forward-looking approach
and be vigilant of Internet-based monopolies’ activities.
Although monopolists will have already gained monopoly
power, this tactic will prevent them from abusing that position
and acting anticompetitively in other markets. Alternatively,
traditional antitrust enforcement should broaden the scope of
its analytical considerations and consider sociopolitical issues
like media consolidation and privacy. Both are implicated by
eMonopoly development, and both represent serious concerns.

279
280

See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
See PORT ET AL., supra note 6, at 426.
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As a result, these factors should be included in weighing
anticompetitive effects. Only by adopting these measures can
antitrust effectively challenge eMonopolies and promote
competition on the Internet.
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